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Abstract—Side-channel attacks have empowered bypassing of cryptographic components in circuits. Power side-channel (PSC)
attacks have received particular traction, owing to their non-invasiveness and proven effectiveness. Aside from prior art focused on
conventional technologies, this is the first work to investigate the emerging Negative Capacitance Transistor (NCFET) technology in the
context of PSC attacks. We implement a CAD flow for PSC evaluation at design-time. It leverages industry-standard design tools, while
also employing the widely-accepted correlation power analysis (CPA) attack. Using standard-cell libraries based on the 7nm FinFET
technology for NCFET and its counterpart CMOS setup, our evaluation reveals that NCFET-based circuits are more resilient to the
classical CPA attack, due to the considerable effect of negative capacitance on the switching power. We also demonstrate that the
thicker the ferroelectric layer, the higher the resiliency of the NCFET-based circuit, which opens new doors for optimization and
trade-offs.
Index Terms—Power side channel (PSC); Correlation power analysis (CPA); CAD for Security; Negative capacitance transistor
(NCFET); Emerging technology; Beyond CMOS
F
1 INTRODUCTION
ADVANCES for CMOS and emerging technologies haveled to the ubiquitous use of electronic systems for ev-
ery aspect of our daily life. To protect sensitive information
within electronic systems, so-called ciphers are widely used,
which are mathematically unbreakable cryptographic algo-
rithms. However, an attacker with physical access can mon-
itor the interactions of the cipher running on the underlying
hardware to make deductions about the secret key. These
physical interactions provide side-channel information and
related attacks are known as side-channel attacks (SCAs).
In this work, we focus on the prominent power side-channel
attack (PSC), where an attacker analyzes the correlation
between power traces and the cryptographic operations
running on the hardware. Numerous types of PSCs have
been demonstrated, including simple power analysis (SPA),
differential power analysis (DPA), and correlation power
analysis (CPA) [1].
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1.1 Negative Capacitance Transistor (NCFET)
NCFET [2] is a promising emerging technology. It over-
comes the fundamental limit in the existing MOSFET tech-
nology related to the so-called “Boltzmann tyranny” [2] that
dictates the sub-threshold swing (SS) of a transistor to be
above 60mV/dec at room temperature. This fundamental
limit restricts the scalability of the threshold voltage for
new nodes, despite the innovations in transistor structures
(e.g., from planar transistors to FinFET, then nanowire, even
nanosheet structures). As a result, gains in performance
and efficiency with technology scaling become increasingly
harder to achieve.
For NCFET, a thin layer of ferroelectric (FE) material is
integrated within the transistor’s gate stack. The FE layer
behaves as a negative capacitance, resulting in a voltage
amplification instead of a voltage drop as in conventional
transistors. Such higher internal voltage pushes SS to move
beyond its fundamental limit. A point of inflection had
occurred when GlobalFoundries demonstrated that NCFET
could be made compatible with the CMOS fabrication pro-
cess [3], by utilizing ferroelectricity in HfO2-based materi-
als, which are standard materials for the transistor dielectric.
Importantly, due to the negative capacitance, the to-
tal gate capacitance of NCFET is always greater than the
conventional/counterpart transistor [4]. Hence, at the same
operating voltage, NCFET-based circuits consume higher
switching power compared to traditional CMOS circuits.
This, in turn, necessitates a deeper understanding of security in
the context of NCFET technology, in particular concerning PSCs.
In this work, we are the first to perform such analysis.
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Fig. 1. (a) NC-FinFET transistor structure, NCFET for short, with ferroelectric layer integrated inside the transistor’s gate stack [4]. (b) Equivalent
capacitance series, where the internal voltage exhibits a greater voltage (Vinternal > VG). (c) Drain current across gate voltage for a p-type
transistor for four different NCFET cases compared to the FinFET baseline. (d) Large increase in the transistor’s gate capacitance (CGG) due to
the negative capacitance effects.
1.2 On the Necessity of CAD Flows for Security As-
sessment of Emerging Technologies
To assess hardware implementations of ciphers w.r.t. PSC
attacks, a widely adopted strategy is to implement them us-
ing a field-programmable gate array (FPGA). However, such
an FPGA-based evaluation may not capture the resilience of
an ASIC implementation accurately, due to the fundamen-
tal differences in the underlying circuit architectures. For
emerging technologies like NCFET, FPGA-based evaluation
is not even an option, to begin with, due to the non-existence
of such platforms like NCFET FPGAs.
Hence, CAD flows that allow developers to evaluate the
resilience of their cipher implementation for different tech-
nologies during design-time become indispensable. Such
CAD flows will not only reveal the role that underlying tech-
nology plays, but it will also allow for: (1) The detection of
vulnerabilities at design-time, providing an early feedback
to improve the cipher implementation; (2) The accurate anal-
ysis of newly-designed cryptographic hardware primitives
and/or countermeasures.
1.3 Related Work
Only a few works have previously analyzed the resiliency
of beyond-CMOS devices against PSC attacks. For example,
Alasad et al. [5] studied the resilience of all-spin logic (ASL)-
based ciphers. They showed that the differential power at
the output of hybrid spintronic-CMOS devices, coupled
with asymmetric read/write operations in the magnetic
tunnel junction (MTJ), poses a security risk. For another ex-
ample, Bi et al. [6] employed DPA to study tunnel-FET-based
implementations of lightweight ciphers like KATAN32.
1.4 Our Contributions
This is the first work to investigate the resiliency of NCFET
against PSC attacks. It is also the first to propose and imple-
ment an attack-evaluation flow using commercial tools for
emerging technologies. Prior art relied either on simplified
power analysis or SPICE simulations, which are limited to
small circuits due to their significant computational time.
More specifically, our flow enables designers to ana-
lyze ciphers (or any other modules), running on emerg-
ing technologies, against the powerful CPA attack. In this
work, the resilience of the well-known Advanced Encryp-
tion Standard (AES) is evaluated and compared for each
NCFET technology setup. We employ sophisticated NCFET
standard-cell libraries and their counterpart baseline library
(7nm FinFET) to analyze how the underlying technology
impacts the power profile of the cipher hardware during
operation. By doing so, we succeed in unveiling the role
which the thickness of the added ferroelectric layer plays
with respect to PSC attacks. Note that our flow can be
easily used for other ciphers as well as for other emerging
technologies (i.e., as long as standard-cell libraries for the
technologies are available).
2 IMPACT OF NCFET ON POWER
The FE layer integrated within the transistor gate stack
manifests itself as a negative capacitance that provides an in-
ternal voltage amplification inside the transistor (Vint > Vg).
The voltage amplification (Eq. 1) is related to both the
internal capacitance of the transistor (Cinternal) and the
negative capacitance obtained by the FE layer (Cferro).
Vint = AV · Vg ; AV = |Cferro||Cferro| − Cinternal (1)
To ensure no hysteresis: |Cferro| > Cinternal ⇒ AV > 1
The internal voltage amplification magnifies the vertical
electric field of the transistor, leading to a higher driving
current. As can be noticed in Fig. 1(c), the drain current of a
transistor in NCFET is always higher than the baseline cur-
rent in the original CMOS FinFET. In fact, the thicker the FE
layer, the higher the drain current. In this work, we consider
four different layer thicknesses of FE, namely 1nm, 2nm,
3nm, and 4nm, which we refer to as TFE1, TFE2, TFE3, and
TFE4, respectively. The thickness is limited to 4nm because
for higher thicknesses, a hysteresis-free operation in NCFET
transistor, which is essential to build logic gates, cannot be
ensured any more [4]. The switching power (Pswitching) of
any logic is governed by the switching activity (α), total
capacitance (C), operating voltage (VDD) and operating fre-
quency (f ): Pswitching ∝ αCV 2DDf . Because Cferro exhibits
a negative value and |Cfe| > Cint, the total capacitance of
NCFET CNCFET is, in fact, always greater than the FinFET
baseline capacitance (Cinternal):
CNCFET =
Cferro × Cinternal
Cferro + Cinternal
> Cinternal (2)
As Fig. 1(d) shows, NCFET transistors always exhibit a
greater gate capacitance (Cgg). When the FE layer thickness
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Fig. 2. CAD flow for PSC evaluation of emerging technologies.
is larger, the gate capacitance becomes higher due to the
greater negative capacitance. Therefore, when a circuit is imple-
mented in NCFET technology, it will consume a higher switching
power when compared to conventional CMOS technology and,
thus, its susceptibility to PSC attacks might be different.
3 CAD FLOW FOR PSC EVALUATION
Next, we present our CAD flow that evaluates crypto-
graphic hardware against PSC attacks (Fig. 2). We focus
on AES in this work; however, our flow is not limited to
a specific cipher. Our flow takes the register-transfer level
(RTL) of the cipher circuit as input, along with the standard-
cell library for the technology of interest, and it returns the
minimum number of power traces required to break the
cipher, i.e., to reveal the secret key. A greater number of
power traces indicates a higher complexity for the attack
and, hence, a lower susceptibility of the cipher hardware
and/or the technology to PSC attacks.
3.1 Simulation-Based Power Analysis
First, the cipher RTL is synthesized using the target tech-
nology library. Then, using a testbench, the functionality
of the gate-level, post-synthesis netlist is verified. After
the user specifies a set of plain-texts and a key (or set
of keys), the testbench generates the corresponding set(s)
of cipher-texts required for verification. During these gate-
level simulations, a Value Change Dump (VCD) file is also
generated; it captures the switching activity of every node
within the netlist in a user-defined time resolution (e.g.,
1 ps). Next, the VCD file is used for power simulation,
along with the post-synthesis netlist and library/libraries
of interest. Note that the dynamic power typically dominates
the power consumption. This holds even more true for
NCFET technology, due to the important role of negative
capacitance for increasing the transistors’ capacitance and
thus magnifying the switching power; recall Section 2.
Instead of full timing simulations, we leverage zero-
delay simulations, for the following reasons. For zero-delay
analysis, all signal transitions occur at the active edge of the
clock, where the peak power values are easier to extract.
For PSC evaluation, in fact, we are mainly interested in
the switching power of particular registers; this switching
power occurs always at the clock edge, whereas glitching
power occurs only after that. Thus, ignoring glitching power
and related noise renders the PSC evaluation conservative
from a security point of view. Besides, we consider only the
relevant time intervals, i.e., the last round of AES [1].
F
Fig. 3. Integration of CPA attack in our CAD flow.
In short, we obtain the design-time power traces for AES
stepwise when processing sets of texts for the secret key(s),
and we extract the peak-power values for the related last-
round operations [1]. We have to do so separately for each
technology setup considered in this work, i.e., for NCFET
with different FE configurations and for the FinFET baseline.
3.2 Correlation Power Analysis
The correlation power analysis (CPA) [1] is a powerful at-
tack that uses Pearson correlation coefficient (PCC) to measure
the relation between predicted and actual power profiles of
a device undergoing some cryptographic operations. These
operations are a function of variable data (i.e., the plain-
/cipher-texts to encrypt/decrypt) and the secret key.
The integration of the CPA attack in our CAD flow is
illustrated in Fig. 3. First, the predicted power consumption
is derived from a power model [1]. Note that such modeling
is to be repeated for all possible candidates of the secret
key; therefore, the resulting values are related to the key
hypotheses and are referred to as hypothetical power values.
Note that the dynamic power depends largely on switching
activities, i.e., on rising signal transitions 0 → 1 and falling
signal transitions 1 → 0. Typically, registers consume a
significant portion of the dynamic power during such transi-
tions. Thus, considering the Hamming distance (HD) for the
output of registers before and after switching transitions is
well-established as HD power model [1]. More specifically, we
consider the registers holding the intermediate round texts
during the last-round operation to build up the HD power
model. Importantly, this consideration is also in agreement
with the scope of the collected design-time traces. Note
that attacking the first or last round is proven to be both
effective [1], with the difference being the use of plain- or
cipher-texts as known references required for the HD power
model. In the final step, the design-time power values and
the hypothetical power values are correlated. The key can-
didates are sorted by the PCC, with the candidate exhibiting
the highest PCC value being considered as the correct one.
The above steps are sufficient for an actual CPA attack.
For quantifying the susceptibility of the hardware and tech-
nology under consideration, however, these steps have to
be conducted throughout multiple trials, e.g., by varying
the secret key and the texts, while tracking the progression
of success rate (i.e., runs where the secret key is correctly
inferred over all runs); see Sec. 4.1 for further details.
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4 EXPERIMENTAL INVESTIGATION
4.1 Setup for CAD Flow and CPA
In our implementation of the CAD flow, we employ com-
mercial tools as follows. We use Synopsys VCS M-2017.03-
SP1 for functional simulations at RTL and gate level, Syn-
opsys DC M-2016.12-SP2 for logic synthesis, and Synopsys
PrimeTime PX M-2017.06 for power simulations.
For the AES implementation, we leverage a regular
RTL, which is working on 128-bit keys and 128-bit texts,
using look-up tables for the AES substitution box, and
without using any PSC countermeasures. We provide the
AES netlist in [7]. For the AES circuit implementations
using the FinFET baseline technology as well as all NCFET-
specific technology setups, we use the same supply voltage
VDD = 0.7V , the same switching activities α (as dictated
by VCS), and the same frequency f = 100MHz. Thus,
Pswitching differs only for varying capacitancesC , given that
Pswitching ∝ αCV 2DDf .
For the CPA implementation, we extend an open-source
C/C++ framework; we provide our version in [7]. All CPA
runs are executed on a high-performance computing (HPC)
facility, with 14-core Intel Broadwell processors (Xeon E5-
2680) running at 2.4 GHz, and 4 GB RAM are guaranteed
(by the Slurm HPC scheduler) for each CPA run.
For the CPA trials, we generate and store ten random
keys (128 bits each). We also generate and store 2,000
random plain-texts (also 128 bits) and, separately for each
key, the corresponding 2,000 cipher-texts. We keep the sets
of keys and corresponding texts the same across the tech-
nologies setups; hence, the simulated power values vary
only due to the underlying technology. Finally, to enable the
CPA attack to progress stepwise through the sample space
of all power traces (to thoroughly quantify the success rate
depending on the number of traces considered), we generate
and store three batches of permutations for power values
and corresponding texts as follows. Over the course of 1,000
steps, we randomly pick 1,000 sets of power values/texts for
each step such that each step describes 1,000 permutations
in multiples-of-two of all 2,000 available pairs of power
values/texts. In total, this results in 1,000,000 permutation
sets of increasing size. For example, for the first three steps,
we might randomly select the following sets of power
values/texts permutations, encoded by indices in the range
1–2,000: {734, 1297}, {87, 815, 562, 33}, and {245, 734, 12,
1395, 1553, 94}. As indicated, we independently generate
three such batches of 1,000,000 permutation sets, which are
employed for three independent CPA trials. To ensure fair
comparisons, these batches are all memorized, stored, and
re-applied when conducting the CPA attack for different
keys as well as for different technologies.
4.2 Setup for NCFET-Specific Library Characterization
As indicated, a standard-cell library of the target technology
is essential. In this work, we employ the open-source 7nm
FinFET cell library as baseline technology [8]. Then, we char-
acterize the library to create the required NCFET-specific cell
libraries [4] (Fig. 4). To achieve that, we use SPICE simula-
tions for post-layout netlists including parasitic information
for a wide range of sequential and combinational standard
cells provided within the 7nm PDK [8].
Fig. 4. NCFET-specific library characterization for 7nm FinFET technol-
ogy.
As is typically done in any commercial standard-cell
library, we characterize power and delay of every stan-
dard cell under 7 input signal slews and 7 output load
capacitances. To model the impact of FE layer and the
negative capacitance effect on the electrical characteristics
of nMOS and pMOS transistors, we employ the state-of-the-
art physics-based NCFET model [9]. We integrate the model
in a self-consistent manner within BSIM-CMG, which is the
industry standard compact model of FinFET technology [4].
The material properties, required for the NCFET physics-
based compact model, were obtained from the experimental
measurement presented in [10].
For a comprehensive analysis, recall that we consider
four different cases for FE thicknesses, ranging from 1nm
to 4nm and referred to as TFE1, TFE2, TFE3 and TFE4,
respectively. Our cell libraries are fully compatible with
commercial CAD tools. Therefore, we can directly deploy
them within our flow to investigate the resiliency of AES (or
other ciphers) against PSC attacks when NCFET technology
is used in comparison to the FinFET baseline technology.
4.3 Results
The primary goal of this study is to investigate the resilience
of the NCFET technology against PSC attacks, i.e., the clas-
sical and powerful CPA attack in particular. The key finding
of this study is the following: the thicker the FE layer, the
more resilient becomes the device. This is because for thicker
FE layers, the negative capacitance effects become greater
and, thus, the dynamic power becomes more dominant and
more varied, rendering the classical CPA more difficult.
Next, we discuss our findings in more detail.
In Table 1, we disclose the number of traces required for
the CPA attack to infer the correct key for varying success
rates (e.g., for a 50% success rate, 500 out of 1, 000 runs
provide the correct key). We report the averages and the
variations (i.e., standard deviations) across all ten random-
but-reproducible keys, and we do so for three independent
trials employing our scheme of random-but-reproducible
permutations for power values/cipher-texts. In Fig. 5, we
illustrate the progression of success rates over CPA steps
(i.e., traces considered), again averaged over the same ten
keys, and further averaged over the same three trials. There-
fore, we enable a truly fair and robust comparison across all
technology configurations.
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TABLE 1
Statistics on Traces Required on Average for Successful CPA Runs
Technology 50% Success Rate 90% Success Rate 99.9% Success Rate
Setup Trial 1 Trial 2 Trial 3 Trial 1 Trial 2 Trial 3 Trial 1 Trial 2 Trial 3Avg Std Dev Avg Std Dev Avg Std Dev Avg Std Dev Avg Std Dev Avg Std Dev Avg Std Dev Avg Std Dev Avg Std Dev
FinFET Baseline 501.5 46.8 502.0 46.6 502.2 45.7 693.0 90.3 688.8 80.6 693.6 86.4 985.2 156.9 991.4 148.9 983.0 151.8
TFE1 503.4 47.2 505.6 48.3 504.3 47.3 698.4 93.5 696.2 92.6 695.2 88.1 987.6 156.2 988.0 144.3 982.6 151.9
TFE2 509.5 49.7 509.6 52.5 507.8 46.2 706.8 94.8 702.2 94.7 699.6 87.9 995.2 151.5 999.2 159.9 985.0 158.7
TFE3 519.6 52.2 520.4 48.3 519.6 51.4 724.4 107.3 718.8 101.2 721.6 103.8 1,011.6 156.4 1,026.6 164.7 1,013.4 165.9
TFE4 547.8 58.9 546.0 57.3 545.6 56.2 759.2 117.4 758.6 111.8 760.8 122.1 1,066.0 192.3 1,065.8 185.9 1,068.4 187.8
For a fair comparison, the same selection of traces is considered across all technology setups. Results are obtained considering all ten random-but-reproducible keys
and for three independent trials employing our scheme of random-but-reproducible permutation of traces.
FinFET Baseline TFE1 TFE2 TFE3 TFE4
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Fig. 5. CPA progression in terms of success rates over traces being
available for consideration. Success rates are averaged across all ten
random-but-reproducible keys and across three independent trials con-
sidering the random-but-reproducible permutation sets for power values
and cipher-texts. Thus, there are 30,000 CPA runs underlying for each
data point for all curves. This ensures a fair and robust comparison
across technology setups, along with thorough sampling across traces
being available for consideration in the CPA framework.
We conclude from both Table 1 and Fig. 5 that TFE4
represents the most resilient setup and the FinFET baseline
the weakest setup, respectively. More specifically, TFE4 is
on average 8.13% more resilient than the FinFET baseline
(i.e., for a success rate of 99.9%). We further conclude that
the increase of both the average resilience and the variation
of resilience from FinFET baseline to TFE4 is not linear, but
more pronounced toward TFE4, which is explained next.
As demonstrated in Fig. 1(d), a larger thickness of the FE
layer results in a higher, non-linear increase in the transistor
gate capacitance; the most significant increase occurs for
TFE4. As explained earlier as well, the dynamic power
depends largely on the capacitances across the whole circuit.
In fact, the total capacitances (of standard cells) and their
impact on dynamic power become both more dominant
and more varied for thicker FE layers. More specifically,
despite the FE layer being identical for the nMOS and pMOS
transistors in all the standard cells, the related negative
capacitance effects play out differently. Essentially, this is
because of different capacitance matching between the FE
layer added to the transistor gate and the MOS capacitance
of the underlying transistor and, hence, varying differential
gains in nMOS and pMOS transistors. The differential gain
(AV ) and the resulting average gain (Aavg) are given in Eq. 3
and related simulation results shown in Fig. 6. As can be
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Fig. 6. Differential gain due to negative capacitance in nMOS and pMOS
FinFET transistors (left) and the corresponding average gain (right).
TABLE 2
Power Values for AES Round-Operations Registers
Power Components FinFET Baseline TFE4
Static or Leakage 3.45E-10 3.17E-10
0→ 1 Transitions
Clk Rise 4.89E-07 6.94E-07
Switching 1.70E-06 3.89E-06
Total 2.19E-06 4.59E-06
1→ 0 Transitions
Clk Rise 4.89E-07 6.94E-07
Switching 1.55E-06 3.17E-06
Total 2.04E-06 3.86E-06
1→ 1, 0→ 0 Clk Rise 4.89E-07 6.94E-07
Transitions Total 4.89E-07 6.94E-07
observed, nMOS transistors exhibits a higher average gain
than pMOS transistors.
AV =
∂Vint
∂VG
, where Aavg =
1
VG
∫ VG
0
AV dVG (3)
Such dis-proportionality leads, in turn, to a varying
impact on the switching power for nMOS and pMOS tran-
sistors. Thus, we observe that the switching power for rise
versus fall transitions of the AES round-operation registers
varies to a greater extent for TFE4 when compared with the
FinFET baseline (Table 2). The varying impact which the
negative capacitance plays for pMOS versus nMOS tran-
sistors, especially for thicker FE layers, thus represents the
root-cause for the higher resilience observed with NCFET
technology—the greater the variations for the rise versus fall
switching power are, the more “noisy” the power samples
become, and the lower the accuracy becomes for the classical
CPA based on the well-established HD power model.
4.4 Discussion
In Fig. 5, note that success rates are dropping momentarily
toward the end of the curves. This is because the longer the
CPA attack progresses, the fewer keys remain unresolved,
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and those remaining “resilient keys” tend to incur lower
success rates over longer periods, resulting in these mo-
mentary drops. Such varying resilience across keys is also
observable from the standard deviations reported in Table 1.
We caution that this finding should not motivate to favor
specific, seemingly “resilient keys” for actual applications—
such outcomes are highly dependent on the architecture,
RTL, and gate-level implementation of the cipher, as well
as the selection of plain-/cipher-texts. Even for very same
sets of texts, which we have used here for all experiments
(to enable a fair comparison), we naturally expect and have
indeed observed varying distributions for the bit-level flips
across the last-round texts of the AES cipher when using
different keys. These varying distributions, among other
aspects, can impact the accuracy of the CPA. We note
that some studies are investigating the role of keys and
texts thoroughly, e.g., based on collision, confusion, and/or
statistical modeling [11], but we also argue that further
consideration of such analytical aspects is out of scope for
this manuscript. In any case, our findings on NCFET are not
contradicted; this is because our findings are centered on
average results obtained across all ten keys considered as
well as across three independent CPA trials.
As indicated before, our flow is applicable to any tech-
nology, be it CMOS, NCFET, or other emerging devices, as
long as those devices are supported by commercial CAD
flows, especially by means of standard-cell libraries being
available. One important aspect for different technologies
are their different operating frequencies. Recall that CPA
considers only the peak power for relevant registers’ tran-
sitions; therefore, while different operating frequencies will
scale the power amplitude/values, it will not hinder correla-
tion within the CPA framework. In fact, we have conducted
a selection of the same experiments underlying Table 1 for
various frequencies, and we observed the same number of
traces for all configurations.
While the absolute numbers of traces required and their
differences across setups may seem small to some readers
(e.g., those familiar with PSC attacks on CMOS devices in
the field), the related findings are significant nevertheless.
As they are grounded on physics-based compact models
and thoroughly-characterized standard-cell libraries, along
with zero-delay power simulation using commercial-grade
tools, these “ideal case” findings represent firm boundaries
for future CPA attack on NCFET devices in the field. That is,
given the inevitably noisy behaviour of devices in the field,
an attacker cannot perform any better than what we note
here (i.e., assuming the same operating conditions). Thus,
from a security-enforcing designer’s perspective, these find-
ings can serve well as conservative guidelines, e.g., for
security schemes like dynamic key updating [12].
As indicated, the root-cause for the observed resilience of
NCFET technology against the CPA attack are the variations
for rise versus fall switching power being more pronounced
for thicker FE layers. While this root-cause and the resulting
effect of power samples becoming more “noisy” would have
a detrimental impact on other PSC attacks as well, a related
quantitative study is scope for future work.
5 CONCLUSION
In this work, for the first time, we have investigated the
resiliency of NCFET technology against power side-channel
attacks. To achieve that, we have implemented a CAD
flow that enables designers to analyze the complexity for
extracting the secret key from their cryptographic hardware
of choice (AES in our case). To properly capture the im-
pact that NCFET technology has on power traces, NCFET-
specific libraries were created based on accurate physics-
based models. Our analysis reveals that NCFET technol-
ogy renders AES more resilient against classical correlation
power attacks, and the thickness of the ferroelectric layer
inside the NCFET transistor plays a major role: the thicker
the layer, the higher the resiliency, due to the greater effects
of the negative capacitance on rise/fall switching power.
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